PRM is a meta-theoretical framework, not a replacement for existing psychological theories. Its unifying claim is structural: that the phenomena different theories describe can be located within a single regulatory architecture, situated according to the functional role they primarily characterise — as inputs to the regulatory computation, as mechanisms through which it operates, or as outputs it produces.
This form of unification does not require that existing theories be translated into PRM’s vocabulary, reconciled with one another, or judged against a common empirical standard. Theories that achieve strong local validity typically do so by isolating particular regulatory functions and examining them carefully. PRM treats that local validity as a datum to be explained, not an obstacle to be dissolved.
What PRM does provide is a shared reference frame. When theories are situated within the same regulatory architecture, apparent incompatibilities can often be understood as differences in functional focus rather than competing accounts of the same phenomenon. Where genuine competition exists, such as where two theories make incompatible claims about the same regulatory function, the architecture makes the disagreement tractable by specifying exactly what is being disputed.
The comparisons below examine how specific theoretical frameworks relate to PRM’s architecture: where they converge, where they diverge, and what the divergences imply for empirical research.